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Abstract 
We report the result of experiments designed to assess the effect of initial endowments 
on willingness to pay values elicited from multi-unit Vickrey auctions.  Comparing bids from an 
“endow and upgrade” approach with the “full bidding” approach, we find that the direction of the 
endowment effect generally depends on the number of endowed units of the conventional 
product that subjects are willing to give up in exchange for units of the upgraded product. The 
endowment effect is “reverse” when the number of units that participants are willing to give up is 
lower or equal to the number of remaining endowed units. However, we generally find an 
endowment effect when the number of units a participant is willing to give up is higher than the 
number of remaining endowed units.   
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A NOTE ON INITIAL ENDOWMENT EFFECTS IN MULTI-UNIT VICKREY AUCTIONS 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In experimental auctions, researchers interested in eliciting people’s valuation for a new 
product or product attribute routinely endow subjects with a conventional good and ask them 
their willingness to pay (WTP) to exchange the endowed conventional good with an upgraded  
good with the attribute of interest.  Many of the researchers that used this approach cite the 
seminal paper by Shogren et al. (1994) where they used this “endow and upgrade” approach to 
examine possible reasons for the disparity between WTP and willingness to accept (WTA) 
values.  Some of the studies that have used this approach include Buhr et al. (1993), Fox et al. 
(1995), Lusk et al. (2000), Hayes et al. (2002), Fox et al. (2002), and Alfnes and Rickertsen 
(2003).    
While this approach has a number of advantages (e.g., related to outside market 
influences, option values) as discussed by Lusk and Shogren (2007) and Corrigan and Rousu 
(2006), the initial endowment can also introduce a bias in the form of endowment effect, 
consistent with loss aversion effects gained from Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) prospect 
theory which implied that people value a good more if it is already in their possession.  Lusk, et 
al. (2004) examined the effect of endowment by comparing differences in bids obtained from an 
“endow and upgrade” approach to the “full bidding” approach, where people bid on both the 
conventional and upgraded goods simultaneously. They found that the sign and magnitude of 
the endowment effect depend on the auction mechanism used.  Corrigan and Rousu (2006) 
also examined the endowment effect by comparing the differences in subjects’ WTP for one unit 
and two units for the same product to subjects’ WTP to upgrade from one endowed unit to 
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another unit of the same product. Their results suggest that endowing subjects with a good 
significantly affects WTP values even in the absence of loss aversion.  They postulated two 
possible explanations: top dog effect (i.e. subjects derive some utility from being declared the 
winner or top dog) and reciprocal obligation effect (i.e., participants want to repay the 
experimenter for endowing them with the product).   
These studies that evaluated initial endowment effects in experimental auctions used 
single unit auction mechanisms.  While these are useful, it is generally not known if these 
effects are present in multi-unit auction settings.  Hence, we deviate from previous studies that 
used single unit auctions by examining the effect of initial endowments on value estimates from 
multi-unit experimental auctions. In multi-unit auctions, multiple units of the same product are 
auctioned and the bidder(s) can bid for more than one unit (Krishna, 2002).  Admittedly, the use 
of multi-unit auctions in applications related to product marketing and pricing is still rare in the 
agricultural economics literature.  However, consumers can be interested as well in purchasing 
not just one but multiple units of a product.  Also, due to increasing time constraints, many 
consumers are becoming increasingly concerned about optimizing shopping efficiency by 
purchasing multiple units of products to save several trips to the store.  While extensively 
studied in the literature, the WTP values obtained from single-unit auctions are only applicable 
for the first unit a consumer is willing to buy. Therefore, single-unit auctions are useful if one 
assumes that people are interested in purchasing one unit during the auction but these auctions 
cannot provide information on consumers’ WTP for subsequent units of the product beyond the 
first unit.  As discussed by Akaichi et al. (2009), the use of multi-unit auctions also allows the 
derivation of demand curve for the product being auctioned for each individual and the market. 
Hence, demand elasticities and consumer surplus measures can be derived, which can then be 
used, among others, in evaluating consumer demand and welfare implications of policy 
interventions (e.g., product taxes, price ceilings, price floors).  Demand elasticity and consumer 
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surplus measures cannot be derived from single-unit experimental auctions since the results 
obtained from these auctions are only valid for a single-unit shopping scenario.  Consequently, 
we suspect that the use of multi-unit auctions for applications related to product pricing, 
adoption, and policy will increase in the near future.   
To our knowledge, our paper is the first to attempt to study the effect of initial endowments 
on values elicited from multi-unit Vickrey auctions.  Specifically, we wish to examine: (1) 
whether endowing participants with multiple units in multi-unit auctions will generate an 
“endowment effect” or “reverse endowment effect”; (2) whether the sign and magnitude of the 
endowment effect change from one auctioned unit to another; and (3) whether the number of 
units that a participant is willing to buy is correlated with the sign and magnitude of the 
endowment effect.  
 
Experimental design 
 
We conducted two experiments using multi-unit Vickrey auctions2 of organic milk in 
June 2009 in Barcelona, Spain. In the first experiment (i.e., “endowment experiment”), we 
endowed each participant with six units of conventional milk and asked them their WTP to 
upgrade from the endowed product to each unit of the auctioned product (organic milk).  In the 
second experiment (i.e., full bidding experiment), we did not endow participants with 
conventional milk and asked them their WTP for the auctioned products. To rule out the windfall 
                                                          
2 The multi-unit Vickrey auction is a generalization of the second price auction (Vickrey). In this 
mechanism, the winner pays an amount corresponding to the sum of the bids (excluding his or her own 
bids) that are displaced by his or her successful bids. However, in the uniform-price auction 
mechanism, all winners pay the same price which is equal to the highest rejected bid (Krishna, 
2002). 
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effect3, which is a principal cause of the reciprocal obligation effect, we reduced the participation 
fee (i.e., roughly the equivalent value of 6 units of conventional milk) of the subjects in the first 
experiment since they were endowed with the conventional milk.  Hence, while participants in 
the second experiment received 15€, participants in the first experiment received 10€ plus the 
six units of conventional milk. To mitigate “outside-market influences” (see Lusk and Shogren 
2007), we also informed all participants in both experiments about the market price of the 
conventional milk considered in the experiment (0.90€). Therefore, in the full bidding 
experiment, we asked subjects to report their WTP for the organic milk knowing that the price of 
the conventional milk is 0.90€ while in the endowment experiment, we asked subjects their WTP 
to upgrade from the conventional milk to the organic milk knowing that the price of the endowed 
milk is 0.90€/unit. 
  
First Experiment 
Eighty randomly selected subjects participated in our first experiment.  These subjects 
were randomly assigned to 8 sessions with 10 participants per session. The auctioned product 
was six identical items of organic milk. The experiment was performed in a room equipped with 
ten computers. We used the z-tree software (Fischbacher, 2007) to collect bids and to 
determine the winner and the clearing price. Participants also had to complete a questionnaire 
eliciting socio-demographic and economic information.  
The experiment was performed in four steps. In step 1, each subject sat in a table 
separated from the rest to minimize any possible interactions and allow anonymous bidding. 
After taking a seat, each participant received an envelope which contained 10 Euros as 
compensation for their participation, his or her identification number (to be held in secret during 
                                                          
3
 Participants endowed with a product may feel somewhat wealthier and try to be kind to the 
experimenter by bidding high values for the auctioned product 
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the process) and a questionnaire. We also endowed participants with six items of one-liter 
conventional milk (with the same brand and fat content as organic milk being auctioned). To 
avoid brand effects, we covered all the milk items with white paper. We then asked participants 
to complete the questionnaire. 
In step 2, once the questionnaire was completed, the actual experiment began. One of the 
main determinants of success in experimental auctions is a good understanding by the 
participants of the operating procedures used in the auction mechanism. To achieve this goal, 
we gave each participant a printed material that included an explanation of how the specific 
auction works and some examples to illustrate the auction. After reading and discussing the 
instructions, participants were given the opportunity to ask questions to dissipate any doubts 
about the process. Finally, to permit a better understanding of the auction mechanism and a 
good familiarity with the software, we carried out a training session, auctioning six identical 
items of organic milk4 and informed participants that no actual economic exchange will take 
place at the end of the training session. In this session, we asked participants to bid the amount 
they are willing to pay to exchange each item of their conventional milk with a unit of organic 
milk. We informed the participants that the only difference between the milk they already have 
and the product to be auctioned was the organic attribute. Once all participants reported their 
bids through the computer, the identification number of winner(s) and the price he/she (they) 
has (have) to pay are displayed in the screen of the computer.   
In step 3, once the participants became familiar with the procedure, we announced the 
start of the real auction of organic milk. Each participant had to submit, again through the 
computer, how much he or she was willing-to-pay to exchange each unit of conventional milk 
with a unit of organic milk. Once all participants finished reporting their bids, the software 
                                                          
4
 In Spain, milk is sold in packages of one unit, four units and six units. We chose to auction the package 
of six units since it is the most purchased package format 
7 
 
displayed whether the participant was the winner or not and the price that he/she had to pay for 
each unit won. The same process was repeated three more times (i.e., with three additional 
rounds of bidding). At the end of the fourth round, one round was chosen randomly to determine 
the binding round. The winner(s) in the binding round was (were) appointed as the winner(s) of 
the auction. Once the results were announced, the experiment ended by handing the product to 
the winner(s) who had to pay the corresponding market-clearing price. 
Second Experiment 
We randomly selected 90 subjects to participate in the second experiment. Sessions were 
conducted in groups of 10 subjects. In this experiment, subjects were not endowed with 
conventional milk but received 15€ each for participating in the experiment. We conducted the 
second experiment using the same four steps as in the first experiment, except that subjects 
were asked their WTP for the organic milk items rather than their marginal WTP to exchange 
conventional milk with organic milk.  As previously discussed, we informed subjects about the 
market price (0.90€) of conventional milk. Therefore, the price premium they are willing to pay 
for the organic attribute is computed by subtracting 0.90€ from their WTP for the organic milk.  
 
Results 
 
Due to the complexity of multi-unit auction data and consistency of the results across all 
four rounds of auctions, we only report results using data obtained from the first round.  
Considering the whole sample, we first test the significance (t-test) of the difference between the 
mean of the price premium for the organic attribute obtained using the endowment method and 
the price premium for the organic attribute obtained using the full bidding method.  We then 
report the results of six Tobit models designed to test the effect of initial endowment of six units 
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of conventional milk on subjects’ valuations. We then conducted an analysis for different 
subsamples based on several characteristics such as the number of the auctioned product the 
participant is willing to buy, gender, age, income, education and presence of children in the 
household.    
As exhibited in Figure 1, the mean of the price premium in the endowment experiment is 
higher than that obtained in the full bidding experiment but the differences are only significant in 
the first, second and the third unit. This result is also evident in the Tobit model for each unit of 
the auctioned product.  The independent variables, consisting of a dummy variable for type of 
experiment/approach and other control variables, used in the Tobit models are listed and 
described in Table 1.  As shown by the coefficients of the “endowment” variable in the Tobit 
models (Table 2), results for the first unit, second unit and the third unit suggest a reverse 
endowment effect. Corrigan and Rousu (2006) found the same results using single-unit auction 
and proposed the presence of “reciprocal obligation effect” (windfall effect) as a likely 
explanation.  We take out this effect in our experiment, however, by informing participants in the 
endowment experiment that the units of conventional milk they received are part of their 
participation fee. We think that the amount of cash money that the participant has to pay if s/he 
is declared the winner is probably the cause of this disparity. For example, in the endowment 
experiment, the winner just has to pay the price premium declared as the clearing price, while in 
the full bidding experiment, the winner of the auctioned product has to pay the whole price. 
Consequently, participants who are endowed with the conventional milk may have greater 
incentive to pay more for the auctioned product and to buy more units of organic milk vis-à-vis 
the participants in the full bidding experiment. 
Results above generally suggest that the differences in WTP values between the 
endowment and the full bidding experiments tend to become insignificant as the number of units 
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of the auctioned product increases. A first intuition of these results is that in the endowment 
experiment, an increase in the number of units that the participant is willing to buy is 
accompanied by a proportional increase in the number of units of conventional milk that s/he is 
willing to give up for units of organic milk. Consequently, the increasing effect of loss aversion 
seems to inhibit the incentives of participants to bid high for the first three units. To test this 
intuition, we separated the subjects in the two experiments based on the number of units of 
organic milk they are willing to buy: buyers of one unit, buyers of two units, buyers of three units, 
buyers of four units, buyers of five units and buyers of six units. We then compared the effect of 
the endowment by subtracting the mean of the price premium from the full bidding experiment to 
the mean of the price premium from the endowment experiment for each of the subsamples and 
through the various units auctioned.  Results in Table 3 exhibit an interesting pattern.  We found 
that when the number of units of the endowed product that the participant is willing to give up is 
lower or equal to the number of remaining endowed units, the endowment effect is reverse (i.e., 
the difference between the premium price obtained in the endowment experiment and in the full 
bidding experiment is positive). However, when the number of units that the subject is willing to 
give up is higher than the number of remaining units, we find a positive endowment effect. This 
finding suggests that the endowment effect in our multi-unit auctions depends on the number of 
units of the endowed or conventional product that the participant is willing to give up.  To further 
support this finding, we graph the price premiums for each auctioned unit and type of buyer in 
Figure 2.  While the price premium for the organic milk in the full bidding experiment is weakly 
increasing (as we expected) in the number of units participants are willing to buy, it is generally 
decreasing in the endowment experiment where participants have to give up more units of the 
endowed conventional milk if they want to buy more units of the auctioned organic milk. While 
some results are not statistically significant due the low number of participants in some sub-
samples (e.g. buyers of 5 units), they are nonetheless significant in economic terms. For 
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example, the differences between the price premium in the endowment experiment and the 
price premium in the full bidding experiment range from 0.05€ to 0.21€, which is equivalent to a 
range of 12.5% to 52.5% of the mean of price premium for organic milk in the market.  
We also examined if the endowment effect is related to some socio-demographic and 
economic characteristics of the participants (see Table 4). Our results indicate that for men 
subjects, there is no significant difference in terms of price premium between the endowment 
and the full bidding experiments. However, women subjects who participated in the endowment 
experiment reported significant higher price premiums for the first two units than women who 
participated in the full bidding experiment. We found that participants who have medium or low 
educational level reported higher price premium when they are not endowed than when they are 
endowed with the conventional milk. However, participants with high educational level bid less 
when they are endowed with the conventional product than when they are not endowed but the 
differences are only significant for the last three units. Also, we found that elder participants 
reported significantly higher price premium when they are endowed with the conventional milk, 
but younger participants (i.e., those below 50 years old) behaved similarly in the both the 
endowed and full bidding experiments. Participants who have children reported higher price 
premium when they are endowed with the conventional milk but the differences are only 
significant in the first three units. Finally, we found that participants with low (<1500€) and 
medium (1500€ to 2500€) income reported higher and significant price premium for the first 
three units when they are endowed with the conventional milk. Hence, our results generally 
show that values from subjects who are men, participants who are younger than 50 years old, 
participants who have high income (>2500€) and participants who have no children do not seem 
to exhibit endowment effects.  More research is needed to determine the reasons for this 
finding.   
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Discussion and Concluding Remarks 
Endowing subjects with goods have been found in previous experimental auction studies 
(e.g., Lusk et al. 2004; Corrigan and Rousu 2006) to significantly influence valuations in single-
unit auctions.  This issue is important since questions may be raised about the accuracy and 
validity of the results from many valuation studies that used the “endow and upgrade” approach 
(Corrigan and Rousu 2006).  In this paper, we further examine the effect of initial endowments 
in experimental auctions but instead of using single-unit auctions as in previous studies, we 
focus on studying the issue in a multi-unit setting using an increasingly useful valuation tool, 
multi-unit auctions.  We suspect that the use of multi-unit auctions for applications related to 
product pricing, marketing, and policy will increase in the near future due to some of its 
advantages over single-unit auctions.  
Our results are quite intriguing.  Using a six-unit Vickrey auction, we found a “reverse” 
endowment effect in the first three units and observed that the direction of the endowment effect 
is related to the number of units that subjects are willing to give up.  Specifically, we found a 
reverse endowment effect when the number of units that subjects are willing to give up is lower 
or equal to the number of remaining endowed units.  However,  we found a positive endowment 
effect when the number of units that subjects are willing to give up  is higher than the number of 
remaining endowed units.   
Since it is beyond the scope of the current study, future research might focus on 
definitively identifying the fundamental reasons behind our general findings.  Our results 
generally suggest that in addition to loss aversion effects caused by the tendency of subjects to 
value the products more when they own it, our subjects also tend to decrease their WTP as the 
number of units of the endowed product they have to give up increases. Some researchers 
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have tried to take out loss aversion effects by decreasing the ownership of the endowed 
product. For example, Corrigan and Rousu (2006) informed their participants that they will 
receive the endowed good at the end of the experiment.  Plott and Zeiler (2007), on the other 
hand, informed their subjects that it will be by pure chance (flipping a coin) that they will receive 
a product (i.e., either mugs or pens) and that the subjects in the next door will receive the 
alternative good.  Hence, it might be interesting in future studies to test the effect of decreasing 
the ownership of the endowed products on loss aversion effects in multi-unit auctions.  
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Table 1. The independent variables used in the Model estimation 
Label of independent 
Variables 
Name Description 
Endowment 
ENDOWMENT 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the subject 
participated in the endowment experiment; and 0 
otherwise 
Gender 
GENDER 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the participant is 
male; and 0 otherwise 
Age AGE Continuous variable: age of the participant 
High education level HIGH_EDU 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the participant 
has a high education level (university degree); and 0 
otherwise. 
High income HIGH_INC 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the participant’s 
income is more than 2500€/month; and 0 otherwise 
Subjects who have 
children 
CHILDREN 
Dummy variable that takes the value 1 if the participant 
has children; and 0 otherwise 
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Table 2: Tobit models regression 
  
MODEL1 
UNIT1 
MODEL2 
UNIT2 
MODEL3 
UNIT3 
MODEL4 
UNIT4 
MODEL5 
UNIT5 
MODEL6 
UNIT6 
CONSTANT        0.471***       0.337** 0.190 0.099 0.031 -0.033 
ENDOWMENT        0.177***      0.163**   0.125* 0.098 0.122 0.118 
GENDER 0.052 0.108   0.134* 0.135 0.146  0.14* 
AGE       -0.001       -0.001       -0.001 0.000       -0.001 -0.001 
CHILDREN       -0.149**       -0.136*       -0.211***       -0.215***    -0.197**   -0.207* 
HIGH_EDU       -0.038       -0.036 0.013       -0.008       -0.070 -0.042 
HIGH_INC       -0.111       -0.046 0.007 0.007 0.077 0.091 
Loglikelihood -106.41 -108.27 -107.13 -113.03 -110.82 -105.33 
Wald chi2 13.78 11.95 14.82 11.07 10.14 11.35 
Prob > chi2 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.08 0.11 0.07 
*** (**) (*) Statistically significant at 1% (5%) and (10%) level 
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Table 3: Difference in Premium Prices Obtained from Endowment Experiment and Full Bidding 
Experiment: Buyers of Different Units by Auctioned Unit  
  Buyers 1 unit Buyers 2 units Buyers 3 units Buyers 4 units Buyers 5 units Buyers 6 units 
UNIT1 0.13 0.19 0.10 -0.05 -0.15 -0.10 
UNIT 2 - 0.21 0.12 -0.10 -0.11 -0.08 
UNIT 3 - -   0.12* -0.14 -0.08 -0.08 
UNIT 4 - - -   -0.21* -0.08   -0.09* 
UNIT 5 - - - - -0.05     -0.11** 
UNIT 6 - - - - -     -0.11** 
Number of Bidders 18 18 16 10 5 76 
*** (**) (*) Statistically significant at 1% (5%) and (10%) level 
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Table 4: Difference in Premium Prices Obtained from Endowment Experiment and Full Bidding 
Experiment: Socio-Demographic Groups by Auctioned Unit. 
  UNIT1 UNIT2 UNIT3 UNIT4 UNIT5 UNIT6 
GENDER 
MAN 0.01 -0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02 
WOMAN      0.16**         0.14** 0.06 0.02 0.02 0.00 
EDUCATION 
HIGH 0.07 0.06 -0.01  -0.10*  -0.11* -0.12* 
MEDLOW      0.14**      0.12**    0.09*   0.09*      0.09**     0.08** 
INCOME 
HIGH 0.03 0.01 0.01 -0.02       -0.03     -0.03 
MEDLOW      0.16**      0.15**   0.08*  0.05 0.05 0.05 
AGE 
[18,29] 0.17 0.14 0.03 0.00       -0.01 0.04 
[30,49] 0.00 0.00 -0.01 -0.05       -0.05 -0.05 
[50,67]         0.29***         0.25***        0.22***         0.19***        0.17***       0.14** 
CHILDREN 
WITH      0.16**      0.16**   0.10* 0.07 0.04 0.04 
WITHOUT  0.08 0.05 0.03 0.00 0.02 0.02 
*** (**) (*) Statistically significant at 1% (5%) and (10%) level 
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Figure 1: Mean of the price premium for the organic attribute obtained in the endowment 
and the full bidding experiment. 
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Figure 2: Price Premiums for Each Auctioned Unit and Type of Buyer 
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